This collection explores various expressions of cultural clash and exchange, and examines some of the ways in which language was used to express difference, to mark out cultural difference, and to further label those cultures — often as alien and inferior, but sometimes as different and worthy of respect. This theme unites papers coming from a range of perspectives and engaging with a whole series of cultural interchanges and conflicts.
It brings together work on a wide range of peoples — Latins, Byzantines, Muslims, and Jews — commenting on and writing about each other, as well as a wide variety of different genres, from theology to farce.
- Una cosa da nulla (Super ET) (Italian Edition).
- 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Cairo (Egypt).
- Marble Past, Monumental Present;
- Kingdoms of North Africa - Islamic Egypt.
This volume seeks to offer a broad and wide-ranging approach to understanding the world at the time of the crusades through the words of participants and observers. If you have personal access to this content, log in with your username and password here:. Guckin De Slane, Histoire des Berberes, Alger, , illustrates a very comprehen- sive knowledge of Berber history and appears sympathetic to their aspi- rations.
He divided Berbers into two great branches, al-Baranis seden- tary, from the plural of "Bernous," or "cloak" and Madghis al-Abtar or al-Botr "nomadic". Al-Botr moved from the steppes and the highlands between the Nile and southern Tunisia into the Jabal Nafusa in Libya and into Algeria, where they settled in the areas of Tahart and Tlemcen, while others continued into Morocco, spread along the Mulwiyya and Sabu rivers and on the fringe of the Sahara.
Some of the Baranis moved from the Aures and Kabylia regions into the area of Oran and further on to central Morocco and parts of the Rif. Furthermore, Ibn Khaldun distin- guished three major groups among the Berbers — Masmuda, Sanhaja, and Zanata— and ascribed to each a separate genealogy leading to a common ancestor. Although this dichotomy of Berber history— al-Baranis and al-Botr— is linked to his rural-urban dichotomy, it is less valuable and has probably caused much confusion in Berber scholarship. His sim- plified classification based in part on classic ideas appears to be mis- guided in stating that Berbers were relatively new settlers from the east— specifically the folktale of Goliath's migration to the Maghrib af- ter his defeat.
From a modern anthropological perspective, not only is this folk history discredited, but so also is the notion that ethnic groups in a region such as the Maghrib can be neatly classified as either seden- tary or nomadic. Human adaptation in the Maghrib is far too complex and messy for such a simple and static dichotomy to explain. The attitude of the Berbers toward the Arab advance in the seventh century was expressed in two major ways. Berber warriors fought on the side of the Arabs on their march through North Africa against the Byzantine forces.
Tarif and his men, the first to cross the straits into Spain, were Berbers, as were Tariq Ibn Ziyad and his force of 12, who overran the Visigoth capital Toledo. The main body of the army that conquered the Iberian Peninsula and pushed deep into France con- sisted of Berber contingents. This resistance was illustrated in the revolts of al-Kahina and of Kusayla Ibn Lemten.
Publications de l’Institut national d’histoire de l’art
More dangerous was the insurrection of a large tribal confederation under Maysara al-Matghari, which in the last days of the Umayyad led to the defection of the whole Berber country. Inseparably connected with the political quality of this resistance is its religious dimension in the form of popular adoption of the Kharejite doctrine and practices.
This heresy, viewed as revolutionary by ortho- dox Sunni Islam on which the caliphate sustained its political leader- ship, was in decline in the east, while its variants, such as the Ibad- hiyyah and the Sufriyya, found fertile soil in Berber political and economic grievances in North Africa. The growing number of Berber proselytes came from among the early converts to Islam, from pagan tribes and the Christian sedentary communities. A number of heterodox Berber theocracies were established in the eighth century by the Rustu- mid in Tahart, by the Banu Midrar in Sijilmassa extending eastward into Jabal Nafusa in Tripolitania, by Abu Qurra in Agadir near present-day Tlemcen , and by the Barghwata confederation on the Atlantic coast.
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In the 11th and 12th centuries, the Almoravid dynasty's brand of rigorous orthodox Sunni Islam had forever replaced Kharijite doctrine and prac- tices in Morocco and Algeria, except for scattered communities in North Africa. Berber Ibadithe groups have survived to the present day in Tripolitania in the Jabal Nafusa, in Tunisia on the island of Jerba and in the oases of Jarid, and in southern Algeria in the Oued Mzab, where they make up the Mozabite communities. Longer than the temporal authority of the Arab caliphate and its ver- sion of Islam, the Berbers remained, for the most part, noncompliant to the process of Arabization.
Following the establishment of al-Qayrawan as the seat of the caliph's provincial administrator in the seventh cen- tury, the rise of the Idrissids in the ninth century, coupled with the com- mercial and social relations with al-Andalus, Arabic spread slowly but continuously throughout the 9th and 10th centuries into most parts of North Africa.
It acquired a place of prominence as the exclusive means of learning in major urban and religious centers, some of which devel- oped into major centers of Islamic studies in North Africa Fes, al- Qayrawan, and Tlemcen. The most famous North African dynasties were the Almoravids and the Almohads , who distinguished themselves by their military power, territorial and political expansion, and cultural achievements.
They united the Berbers of North Africa, if only for a short time. After the decline of the Almohads, other Berber dynasties es- tablished themselves in the 13th and 14th centuries, such as the Hafsids in Tunisia and East Algeria, v Abd al-Wadids or Banu Za- yyan in Tlemcen, and Marinids and Wat- tasids or Banu Wattas in Morocco.
Although with minor variations, within the widespread Berber soci- ety, Berbers have crafted age-old social and economic institutions.
They have developed a sophisticated body of customary law that has survived the Islamic period because Islam has usually accommodated the prac- tice of customary law, or azerf, within its system of jurisprudence, as long as azerf 'does not deliberately violate the most fundamental princi- ples and articles of faith of Islamic law, or sharPa. Customary law, known also by its Arabic name "urf, is not uniform among Berber groups, with the socially stratified Tuareg and the democratically ori- ented Berbers in North Africa exemplifying two major types of Berber political organization.
Algiers In The Ottoman Period: The City And Its Population
In the 19th and 20th centuries, for political reasons French colonial administrations in Alge- ria and Morocco accorded official recognition to Berber customary law and its dispensation in tribal and rural courts. In Morocco, nationwide opposition led to the revocation of the Berber Dahir as far as penal ju- risdiction was concerned.
Although Imazighen are unjustly considered a minority in North Africa, the area that Berber speakers inhabit is vast and testifies to the sheer size and broad spread of the Amazigh population. Tamazgha, or the original homeland of the Berbers, stretches east to west from Siwa in the Western Desert of Egypt to the Canary Is- lands and north to south from the Mediterranean shores to Mauritania and the southern limits of the Niger and Senegal rivers.
A series of Berber-speaking villages extend from Jabal Nafusa in Libya through southeastern Tunisia to the island of Jerba, where many Berbers practice the Ibadithe sect. In Tunisia, Berber speakers constitute less than 1 percent of the population, while they make up 4 percent of the population of Libya. South of the mountains lie the oases of the Mozabites, Ibadithe Berbers who live in five villages along the Oued Mzab. The number of Tuareg varies from sources to source, and the estimates vary between 2 and 3 million.
- Islamic Egypt.
- Il liberatore Le nove torri (Italian Edition).
- Scholars Involved in Arabic Papyrology - Institut für den Nahen und Mittleren Osten - LMU München.
- Uqayribat - Wikipedia.
- Cairo - Wikipedia?
- Cross (Jack Taylor series Book 6)!
- Algiers In The Ottoman Period: The City And Its Population!
In Algeria, Berber speakers constitute about 20 percent of the Algerian population. In Mo- rocco, Berber speakers make up about 45 to 50 percent of the popula- tion Mohamed Chafiq estimates the number of Berber speakers in Mo- rocco to be about 80 percent. In all, despite the fact that the exact numbers of Berber speakers in Tamazgha and in the diaspora are hard to come by because of the sensitive political nature of census taking, official as well as nonofficial estimates point to a range of between 15 and 50 million Berber speakers.
The last half of the 20th century, despite playing leading roles in the fight against colonialism and nation building of their respective nation- states, has not been kind to the aspirations of the Berbers in North Africa. Ever since independence, government policies have marginal- ized Berber regions, stifled and belittled Berber language and culture, and displaced and destabilized entire populations, as in the case of the Tuareg refugees. Since the uprising in Tizi Ouzou in the spring of , also known as the Berber Spring, Berbers have organized and demonstrated for cul- tural, linguistic, and economic rights — and self-determination or re- gional autonomy in the case of the Tuareg.
Berbers believe that they have been shortchanged by state policies of education, culture, and eco- nomic modernization. Government responses, in most cases, have been brutal and repressive and usually took the form of police crackdowns and military assaults. To complicate matters even more, the rise of po- litical Islam and its relentless pursuit of a strict orthodox Sunni Islam in the s further aggravated the situation and demands of the Berbers.
Arab and Amazigh Islamists , despite North Africa's history of religious syncretism and hybridity, tend to view Berber grievances with contempt and see in the secularist Berber demands of cultural pluralism, democ- ratization, and human rights a threat to the Islamic way of life and its vehicle the Arabic language, however that is defined. Today, the Amazigh question remains a sensitive cultural and politi- cal issue in North Africa because it is explicitly connected to a range of contested ideas about language, place, and religion— or politics of iden- tity boundaries.
In the first years of the 21st century, to circumvent Amazigh cultural and linguistic rights and identity claims, North African governments have made hesitant efforts to at least start the dis- cussion of the remote possibility of considering Tamazight an official and equal language to its sister, Arabic, in their constitutions. While Tamasheq, the language of the Tuareg, is a national language in Niger and Mali, the politicking of the Amazigh question is an ongoing, fren- zied contest between Arabists , Islamicists , and secularists in Algeria and Morocco. However, short of a constitutional recognition of Tamazight and a clear mandate backed by a solid budget and effective directives for the teaching of Tamazight in public schools, allocation of media time for Tamazight and other Tamazight dialects, and recognition of the Amazigh role in the formation processes of North African states, the ceremonial acts invested in the establishment of task forces, commis- sions, and institutes for the inclusion of Tamazight and all things Amazigh into the North African identity matrix will remain for some time to come unfinished business or, in North American parlance, "business as usual.
Despite his modest socioeconomic background, he earned a baccalaureate in mathematics. Afterward, he served as a clerk in the colonial adminis- tration in the city hall of the mixed commune of Chelghoum el- Aid, former Chateaudun-du-Rhumel and as a noncommissioned officer in the French army during World War II. In , Abbane was arrested in the wake of the French crackdown of the paramilitary organization Organisation speciale OS.
He was sentenced to six years in jail, with internment in the Haut-Rhin in France. Abbane is best remembered for his active role in shaping the Soummam Valley Congress on 20 August in Kabylia.
Full text of "Historical Dictionary of the Berbers"
Under his skillful and fiery leadership, the congress adopted a political platform as well as a military reorganization framework of the Armee de Liberation Nationale ALN that members of the external delegation of the FLN Ahmed Ben Bella and Mohamed Boudiaf rejected. Al- though the Soummam framework favored collective political leadership, A- F. His role in the Soum- mam Valley Congress as well as his stand on the principles that the external delegation should be subordinate to the internal affairs and leadership of the revolution and that the civilian and political wing of the FLN should control the military made him undesirable in several nationalist circles.
In , he was lured by his detractors to Mo- rocco, where he was strangled to death by the external delegation leaders of the FLN.
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His murder eliminated a passionate and tireless Kabyle, who had the potential to provide a social and economic roadmap for the revolution. His death also opened the door to the mil- itary to take control of Algeria's politics and fate. Recent revisionist and official history of the Al- gerian revolution and its politics has reevaluated Abbane 's contribu- tions to the struggle against the French and has rehabilitated his place and legacy as a bona fide Algerian nationalist or chef historique. Theologian of the Malikite school of law, professing puritan convictions, descended from the Jazula, one of the Sanhaj a tribes nomadizing in the Sahara.
Invited by the Guddala and Lamtuna tribes, he went preaching among them and led a rigorous campaign against practices that he considered contrary to the shari a and proceeded to build an Islamic community Soon, however, Guddala opposition to his strict religious norms caused Ibn Yasin and his followers to withdraw to an island along the Senegal River.
There he created a militant reforming movement, a ribdt, sus- tained by the holy war for the defense of the spread of the faith. Within a short period of time, this small community of M urdbitin was joined by other adepts and led by Ibn Yasin, who founded the history- making Almoravid Empire. While still a youth, he left his home to study in the Arab East al-Mashriq at the renowned seats of religious learning, and he joined Ibn Tumart when he heard him preaching around Bougie.
He remained his master's most devoted disciple who shared in all his wanderings westward and together with him rallied under the Almohad flag of the M asm ll da tribes of the At- las, calling them to the holy war against the Almoravid Empire. He was closest to Ibn Tumart, and it was he whom the Mahdi Ibn Tumart shortly before his death instituted as his successor Having brought under his sway, in a struggle of about 20 years, the whole of Morocco and western Algeria, Abd al-Mu'min carried the holy war into Spain and eastern Algeria and Tunisia, where the Zirid and Hammadid emirs at al Mahdiya and Bougie defended their shrinking realms with little hope for survival against the pressure of Arab Bedouin tribes and the Normans of Sicily.
As Amir al-Mu'minin Commander of the Faithful , the secular and spiritual head of the state, he elaborated for the requirements of an empire the system of public administration, devised by Ibn Tumart and founded on a com- bination of tribal institutions, a sort of religious hierarchy and mili- tary structure, with governors of the provinces and larger towns se- lected from among his own or Abu Hasf 'Umar's clans.
Related La route de Qâhira (Roman historique) (French Edition)
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